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Introduction 
Arguably anxiety is one, if not the, defining characteristic of 
late industrial societies; it insinuates itself into the interstitial 
spaces of common and personal life and is manifest in a 
scepticism that a range of social practices and institutions can 
provide epistemologically, ethically and ontologically 
adequate resources for our day-to-day living. Philosophers 
and social theorists have increasingly replaced the ‘search for 
truth’ with the ‘search for meaning’ – a quest that has come 
to shape our discourse about the purposes of religious 
education in not only common schools but also in religiously 
denominated schools. If students are no longer required to 
attend to the truth claims of religion they should certainly 
attend to the meaning these claims have for their adherents. 
Moreover they should draw on the insights of religious belief 
systems to inform their own ‘meaning-making’ (learning 
from religion). The displacement of a more traditional, 
epistemologically-loaded, study of religion by such personal 
‘meaning-making’ was intended to enhance the relevance of 
the subject and its efficacy as a resource for living with 
oneself and with the other. It is, we would suggest, not 
unreasonable to ask whether or not the pre-eminent place 
afforded meaning in religious education has conduced to the 
realization of such enhanced efficacy. This essay offers one 
attempt to investigate how such questions of meaning are 
treated in the day-to-day transactions between religious 
educators and students in and beyond the classroom.  
 In 2007 the Arts and Humanities Research Council and 
Economic and Social Research Council in the UK launched 
their joint programme on ‘Religion and Society’ and the 
study which informs this essay was funded by this 
programme. The project had the elegantly simple title, ‘Does 
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Religious Education Work?’ and the centrepiece was an 
ethnographic study in 24 schools (common and religiously 
denominated) across the UK of the practices that surround 
and inhere in religious education.  In addition to our 
multimodal ethnography (Walford 2008) we conducted 
professional seminars using the Delphi method (Baumfield et 
al 2011), text book analyses, policy analyses, participant 
research, and an on-line questionnaire was made available to 
pupils in all of the participating schools.. As far as possible 
we allowed the ethnographic data to speak for itself and used 
an‘emergent themes’ process to foreground our questions and 
interrogations. One of those emergent themes was ‘meaning 
making’. In other words, we did not begin with the question, 
‘what does x mean?’ but with the data itself. Hence we do 
not, at the beginning, offer a substantive account of meaning 
in  religious education but have chosen to defer that 
discussion to the end. In that way we hope to free up the 
material from being overly determined.  How pupils 
experience RE as depicted in the case studies offers some 
uncomfortable insights into their perceptions of the nature of 
the subject, particularly in the context of preparing for public 
examinations.  We have selected particular instances
1
 where 
the pupils themselves have highlighted discrepancies between 
the aims and the enactment of RE in the classroom for 
particular attention.  In doing so, we make no claim to 
uniformity or universality of experience but would suggest 
that they raise highlight important tropes in the experiences 
and practices of the subject in secondary schools. The extent 
to which our concerns represent a fundamental fracture 
in the fabric of RE in our schools can be tested 
cumulatively through the replication of the methods we 
have used in the project and to this end, we will be 
making our ethnographically rich data sets available 
online.  
                                                        
1 It would have been possible to substitute many other examples for 
those highlighted here. The examples here were so chosen because 
they exemplified very particular kinds of failures of meaning. 
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 In what follows we attempt to contextualise religious 
education in the UK in current discussions of efficacy, as 
manifest in inspectoral reports and allied scholarship, 
illustrate how complex are the entailments and purposes of 
religious education, explore some of the ethnographic and 
related data to understand something of how meaning is 
transacted in the lived experience of the classroom and, 
finally, attempt to locate that material in more general 
observations about the nature of meaning in religious 
education.  
 
 
The Context and the Purposes of Religious Education  
With its explicit mention some 11 times, the most 
recent Ofsted subject report, Transforming RE (Ofsted, 2010), 
foregrounds ‘meaning’ as a central, perhaps the central, 
feature of religious education. Such a concern is not evident 
in cognate subjects such as history, which mentions it not 
once (Ofsted 2011)
2
. Even the recent OfSTED (2012) report 
on the teaching of English, Moving English Forward, features 
only 7 mentions of meaning, of which only one is actually 
concerned with the meaning of language. The majority are 
focused on activities that are ‘meaningful’ for the students. 
Hence meaning here becomes a synonym for ‘relevance’ and 
may not be considered primarily as concerned with the 
meaning of the object of study in and for itself. 
Given the centrality that meaning appears to play in the 
espoused purposes of RE, it is important to understand the 
nature and extent of its instantiation in the practices of 
religious education in the schools that form the locations for 
this study. Somewhat ironically, in Transforming Religious 
Education success at Key Stage 4 was considered not with 
respect to its efficacy in unfolding meaning but in the 
‘increase in the number of students leaving with an accredited 
qualification’. In light of the many other observations about 
                                                        
2 The history report, ‘History for All’ uses ‘meaningful’ twice but, 
like the English report this is in connection with making the 
activities meaningful for the students as an educational exercise. 
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weaknesses in teaching the increase in uptake does not self-
evidently appear to be the consequence of improved quality, 
nor indeed to have led to a concomitant increase in resources 
(material or time allocation). Such concerns as are raised in 
the Ofsted Report are echoed in Jackson’s et al (2010) 
analysis of materials used in the teaching of religious 
education. The Report points out that there was a widespread 
perception [amongst academic consultants] that ‘many of the 
resources fell short in conveying a real sense of the deeper 
significance and power of religions in the lives of the 
believer…’ (ibid p.6). This concern with the deeper 
significance and power of religion is of course another way of 
pointing to the centrality of meaning in religious education. 
A protracted series of additional comments in the 
Ofsted Report, with some 24 discussions of specific 
weaknesses, suggests that the provision of high quality 
religious education is in a parlous state across a substantial 
range of entailments, including specifically religious content, 
intellectual challenge, assessment, limited access to subject 
specialists and timetabling difficulties. It might be suggested 
that these weaknesses are contingent, reflecting little more 
than that RE is often taught by inadequately prepared, and not 
infrequently non-specialist teachers, and under-led and 
resourced by senior managers in schools. Indeed our own 
research report exposes some such contingent weaknesses in 
many of the schools we studied (Conroy et al 2011). 
However, this cannot be the sole explanation for such 
systemic weakness given that, during our ethnographic work, 
we found varied and complex failures of meaning despite the 
schools self-identifying as having confidence in their provison 
for religious education. Rather, we would suggest, everyday 
RE is striated with failures of meaning that emanate from 
foundational or constitutive confusions in the conduct of the 
subject that are deep seated. These constitutive failures, we 
propose, emerge out of epistemic and values confusions about 
the very purposes and meaning of religious education in a late 
industrial society.  
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While the purposes of RE are multiple and complex, at 
its core two competing impulses rub awkwardly against each 
other – the epistemological impulse to understand the nature 
of the thing-in-itself and the ethical impulse to appropriate the 
study of religion as a means to cultivate certain moral 
dispositions and attitudes (Grimmitt 1987). This conflation 
potentially gives rise to a crisis of meaning in so far as the 
first impulse must perforce rest on a position of substantive 
epistemic neutrality whilst the second must abjure, to a 
greater or lesser extent, such neutrality. This epistemic and 
ethical conflict in turn gives rise to a conflict with regard to 
the meanings of the activities themselves. Hence the anxieties 
(expressed in the Ofsted and other reports) concerning the 
efficacy of religious education may equally be themselves 
anxieties about meaning.  
Let us expand on this a little. From our analysis of the 
claims and practices of religious education and arguably as a 
consequence of maintaining many of the structural features of 
religious education, which were created in the nineteenth 
century, into the twenty-first century has been that policy 
makers and professionals alike are unclear about the 
specifically educational purposes of religious education 
(Baumfield et al 2011). They do not wish to ‘give up’ 
religious education for significant political and cultural 
reasons, but have consequently burdened it with a great many 
competing imperatives. These include, but are not exhausted 
by, substantial contributions to the following educational 
entailments
3
, many of which have overlapping elements but 
some, at least prima facie, are conflicting: 
 
a. Religious literacy (knowledge and understanding 
religious ideas and language and their social and 
cultural impact 
                                                        
3 This list derives from the findings of (1) a two-day Delphi seminar 
for professionals from a range of interest groups in the field, (2) 
reports from teachers involved in the project, and (3) published 
policy and pedagogical materials. It is not intended to be exhaustive 
but representative.  
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b. Dealing with truth claims and pluralism 
c. Philosophical understanding  
d. Understanding heritage 
e. Citizenship education 
f. Multicultural sensitivity and awareness 
g. Spiritual and social cohesion –contributing to 
school ethos 
h. Nurturing pupils in particular communities 
(including catechesis) 
i. Moral development 
j. Spiritual life and religious observance 
k. Enhancing local demographic considerations 
l. Very particular ‘Socratic dispositions’ 
m. Sex and relationships education 
 
On top of this complex concatenation we must overlay yet 
further entailments such as examination success, personal 
development, the cultivation of creativity, the promotion of 
community cohesion and so forth.  While we do not wish, at 
this stage, to further disaggregate these entailments, we would 
point out that they provide a formidable account of what it is 
intended that religious education will offer to students. 
Although we might not expect every student in every 
circumstance to consciously attend to these myriad features of 
religious education, we are nevertheless likely to desire that 
they are able to make sense of (understand and interpret) as 
well as ascribe meaning to those entailments that comprise 
religion as a whole. Consequently, if they understand only 
fragments, can they be said to be religiously educated? 
Moreover, can we ever say that we have a legitimate 
expectation that students acquire such a synoptic view if we 
are unclear as to whether or not the teacher has the same 
view? The answer to these questions must surely reside in the 
actual cases of students and teachers. In the next section we 
therefore wish to look at some such cases in order to 
understand a little more how meaning is or is not transacted in 
the everyday experience of the classroom. Having done so we 
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will use them to uncover and reflect on more general issues of 
meaning in the social practices of teaching religious education. 
 
 
Fieldwork 
 
Example 1. A lower 6th Interview in a London 
Comprehensive School 
 
Interviewer: …you were saying that the 
philosophy is quite different? 
 
Student: Yes, I think it’s very different actually. 
Because in RS it’s more about this is what this 
religion thinks and this is what that religion 
thinks, compare this view, at best! Compare this 
and that, whereas with philosophy it’s more of a 
coming to those ideas. Before you even get to 
these theological issues… 
 
I: You’re saying that a lot of them don’t 
really know why they’re Muslim. Do you 
think RS helps with that at all? 
 
S: No. 
 
I: No? 
 
S: No. Because RS...RS isn’t philosophy. RS is 
just saying this is the way things are. It can help 
in some ways to say this is what this faith 
believes, so when you find Islam, this is what 
Islam says. ... I think it’s...the way RS is taught 
is, these are the rules. This is what people do, 
but Islamicly, the way I see it, the way Islam 
should be taught really is not about, these are the 
rules, it’s these are the principles and this is how 
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you come to the rules. So it’s...I think that’s kind 
of the problem. People will say, ok I have to fast 
and pray five times a day and this that and the 
other but for me that’s not where it should start. 
It should start before that. So... 
Because whoever’s teaching would have to be 
able to fully appreciate the, not the idea, but the 
style of thinking and stuff.  
 
 
The observations from the student in this interview point to 
our first concern with meaning. Operating from within a 
particular religious tradition (Islam), the student considers the 
teaching of religious education to be flawed in so far as it is 
concerned with comparative descriptions of social phenomena 
and practices rather than with religion as a way of not only 
construing but being in the world. Moreover, this resonates 
with other student comments and ethnographic observations 
from students in schools with relatively large numbers of 
religiously affiliated students. Inadvertently the student 
touches on the well-trodden Wittgensteinian path of the 
incommensurability of religious outlooks, suggesting that 
there are questions around the full appreciation of ‘the style of 
thinking...’ We are not persuaded that incommensurability 
simpliciter is at issue here- after all people from quite 
different religious traditions can communicate their ideas 
reasonably well in a wide range of contexts. And, as Ricoeur 
points out while,  
 
an event belonging to one stream of 
consciousness cannot be transferred as 
such into another stream of consciousness. 
Yet, nevertheless, something passes from 
me to you. … This something is not the 
experience as experienced, but its 
meaning. Here is the miracle. The 
experience as experienced, as lived, 
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remains private, but its sense, its meaning 
becomes public… (1976, 16) 
 
But even if the communication failures are not 
straightforward, it is possible to see them embedded in the 
clash not between a set of religious claims, but between 
pedagogical purposes––a theme that emerges repeatedly in our 
ethnographic and policy studies. Following Ricouer we can 
see that it is not that students mis-understand or mis-represent 
to themselves what is being communicated, rather it is that 
they deem the morphological discussion of religion within the 
classroom as having little salience in their religious lives. As 
the respondent goes on to observe,  
 
Because they are second, third 
generation Bengalis... school is a 
completely different experience all 
together and the way they’re taught...RS 
would probably have been the first time 
they would have seen it in that kind of 
context in that way. So it’s almost like 
you get two opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Like you get the cultural stuff 
and then you get the...what they learn in 
school...I wouldn’t say it’s exactly what 
Islam is. It’s different…I dunno...it’s 
strange. 
 
 
What may be at stake here is the way in which the 
purposes of religious education are enacted in the 
conversational space. The gap between student and teacher 
emanates from the different meanings ascribed not to the 
religious cogitationes but to the purpose of religious 
education. The student in this case considers that the purposes 
of teaching religion in his classroom appeared to be dominated 
by somewhat basic comparisons, which misrepresent the 
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‘being-in-the-world’ nature of religious attachment. In this 
case the student considers RE to have been shaped by 
somewhat prosaic morphological considerations to which she 
ascribes little meaning and which fail to connect with the 
meaning she invests in religious being. There is a gap between 
the classroom or school attribution of meaning to the activity 
of studying religion and that of the student – a gap 
summarised in a group discussion in a different school where 
one respondent observes that ‘I think the stuff the school 
teaches us...I think we have to kind of accept it when we’re in 
school because that’s what comes up in exams’ (student 
interview: Girls’ Comprehensive School, London). Here we 
can begin to see quite clearly an important distinction between 
purpose and meaning – passing examinations is purposeful but 
not meaningful.  
 
 
 
Let us now turn to the second example; a set of field notes 
from one of the ethnographers on the project. 
 
 
Example 2. Field notes: North Eastern Church school 
 
  The consequences for the meaning of RE and 
religion itself of the, possibly excessive, priority afforded 
examinations was to be seen in quite a number of the schools 
in our study. As one of our ethnographers observed whilst 
waiting in the departmental office,  ‘ the notice boards had a 
lot of information about targets and performance graphs for 
RE broken down into small units of analysis.’ In one ‘Year 
10 top set’ revision class being observed,  
 
‘… there was persistent low level 
disruption…The … point at which the 
[students] did become engaged was when 
the teacher went through the results of the 
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mock exam and the predicted XXXXX  
Trust grades.  Interestingly, even the most 
apparently disaffected pupils evidently 
cared about the grades and were quite 
competitive’.   
The Department has a VLE on which 
can be found past papers with marks 
schemes for the questions – there are also 
tally counts of how often key-words/terms 
come up and pupils are encouraged to 
check this and make sure they have the 
definitions clear and learn them.  The 
[particular] lesson [observed] focused on 
one question and mark scheme. 
 
Question: 
How might the presence of religion in the world 
demonstrate the existence of God? 
Marks Scheme: 
2 marks per bullet point 
 Many different people believe in God 
 Religions have a common focus and share some 
key ideas 
 Prayers sometimes seem to be answered 
 Believing in God helps people in their life 
 
I found that the class were not really engaged in 
the lesson and overheard the ; 
“I’ve written it so that I won’t seem very clever.” 
“I don’t believe in any of them – why do I have to 
pretend?” 
 
Once again, albeit from a somewhat different perspective,  the 
purpose of religious education is subject to scrutiny from its 
students. The activity of breaking down the information into 
examinations sized gobbits within the lesson appears to echo 
a significant functional purpose of the activity – the passing 
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of examinations. With substantial corroboration from other 
parts of the field notes, it would appear that, for this group of 
students, religious education appears to be both facile and 
futile.  
Perhaps more importantly, the examination question 
itself indicates a further difficulty with meaning. Prima facie, 
it appears to provide a meaningful task  but on closer 
inspection it is revealed as conceptually confused. The 
relationship between the verb ‘to demonstrate’ and the 
possible putative answers suggest a significant gap in the 
communication of the concept of demonstrable belief; and 
indeed what belief might mean for adherents. How, we might 
ask, can the existence of adherents of itself demonstrate the 
existence of God any more than the existence of children who 
believe in Santa Claus lead us to believe in the actual 
existence of Santa Claus?  The issue at stake here is whether 
or not the question is itself meaningful. We would suggest 
that it is both logically and existentially meaningless and 
leads to more confusion than clarity about what constitutes an 
appropriate question in the domain of religion. 
Let us now move to a third, overlapping, example  a focus 
group discussion with GCSE students.  
 
 
Example 3. London Community School Focus Group 
 
 
Interviewer: What are your impressions of RE lessons 
in your school? 
P1: I am not sure of the structure of the lessons; it just 
seems to be random work on people’s feelings. 
P2: would be useful to have an overview at the start 
P3: like what is in the exam 
P2: What happened in the lessons wasn’t in the mock 
exam 
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P4: The book (revision guide) was useful and the 
crammer sessions were OK because only the people 
serious about learning came to them.  In school 
time the lessons are just people messing around. 
P1: Don’t want to always just work to the test though, I 
like things like the Truth Tube stuff.  Could be a 
little less vague if we did a section at time, there’s 
lots of bits. 
P2:  Need to make the aims clear right at the start of the 
lesson. 
P5: It’s helpful if we know what we are doing. 
P1:  But there’s no specific answer, it’s your own 
opinions so you can’t be wrong. 
P5: the arguments and clashes are good, good for 
discussion. 
How do RE lessons compare with other lessons 
in school? 
P1: … more relaxed… you feel that you can express 
your opinions 
P3: RE’s down to what people believe so it’s relaxed 
P1: But some people use the subject and its advantages 
against the teacher, it’s annoying because they take 
advantage… 
P6: It’s about different beliefs but some people…won’t 
learn because they think there is nothing to learn 
because it is just what I believe. 
P2: … – it’s not a good ‘cool’ subject and this affects 
how much you want to join in. 
P1: RE is not taken seriously, even in mock exam we 
were messing about.  Students were running a 
competition about how many times a phrase… 
P3: …like ‘Gordon Brown’s tie’ 
P1: could be used in an answer. 
 
The sense of boredom and scepticism underpinning this 
conversation points beyond itself to one of RE’s central 
challenges– coherence as to purpose and meaning. Students 
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appeared to have absorbed the view that the purposes of RE 
are vague, possibly meaningless, and primarily serve as a 
forum for the expression of personal opinions. The meaning 
of religion as an object of study inheres in its being a site for 
opinion forming; the meaning of RE is the provision of a site 
for agonistic self-expression. Superficially this can appear 
like the cultivation of a kind of Socratic engagement. Such a 
move can be seductive, but, in the dialogues, Plato is not 
much given to the view that ‘it’s your own opinion so you 
can’t be wrong’. Nevertheless, we repeatedly witnessed, from 
teachers and students, the articulation of strongly relativist 
accounts of religious and ethical value and the reification and 
consequent valorization of personal opinion as the core 
purpose of religious education. Ironically, the meaning of 
religion is apt to be lost in the perceived purpose of RE as the 
site for personal positioning and (though this is less evident in 
practice than might be assumed) personal meaning making. 
In the interstices of these commentaries and recordings 
what emerges is a clash of purpose with purpose and purpose 
with meaning, summarised in the following extract from our 
Delphi expert discussion; 
 
A. I’m troubled by this, still religious 
education by and large does entail some moral 
commitment… This of course gets us on to 
some very tricky territory because religions 
enshrine different conceptions of justice and 
fairness… 
 
B: Going back to the non-statutory national 
framework, the description of Religious 
Education at Key Stage 3 was in another 
context a ‘beliefs and issues’ agenda… 
 … 
C: You’re talking about ideas, but I’m talking 
about people… 
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While the discussion here may be somewhat more 
sophisticated than in the case of the students, similar conflicts 
of purpose emerge – that is, the clash between those purposes 
concerned with ideas as locked into the performative 
categories of curricular and examination frameworks and 
those concerned with nurturing certain perceived forms of 
human (personal) development and flourishing. It might be 
argued that similar conflicts of purpose are to be found in 
other curriculum subjects, but that merely serves to reinforce 
the more general educational challenge. More importantly, 
religious education is a different kind of social practice to, 
say, maths education. The two may share similarities to the 
extent that they are both concerned with disclosing features 
of the world to students. However, in the case of maths any 
ethical or indeed existential import is of a second order kind – 
for example, having a sophisticated grasp of number might 
offer a resource for understanding better how national income 
might be effectively redistributed to reduce certain social 
inequalities. In the case of religious education as a social 
practice, the ethical and existential are internal to the practice 
itself. More than that, the purpose of maths is understanding; 
to understand the formal operations of trigonometry does not 
require that we freight the exercise of learning how to do 
trigonometry with an expectation that it will ethically change 
us
4
. Alternatively, the purpose of religious education is, as 
our protagonists have variously intimated, the creation of 
meaning; neither understanding nor evaluation will do. 
 
So many ‘meanings’: so little meaning 
 
But what is it we intend to convey when we talk about 
meaning in such a context?  it is clear from the model 
                                                        
4 Even in those areas where evaluation appears intrinsic to the 
pedagogic intentions it is, with notable exceptions such as 
citizenship, which in any event, shares some crucial features with 
religious education that make it vulnerable to similar challenges. 
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agreed syllabus in England (despite subsequent 
developments), from the work of a wide number of scholars, 
from the teacher comments and practices––and indeed from 
the student reactions and conversations––that meaning in RE 
is dominated by recourse to the personal. Even where 
colleagues disagree about how to bring about the ‘learning 
from religion’, there seems little doubt that they wish to 
communicate that the meanings internal to religion should 
also, in various ways, be internal to the student. Of course 
few of the teachers in our study regarded the cultivation of 
such internal meanings as entirely individualistic. Rather 
teachers considered that they should be nurturing meaning in 
some of the following ways: 
 Personal 
 Inter-personal  - inter subjective 
 Transpersonal   - Transcendent other –openness to the 
claims of transcendent religious experience and claim 
(I and Thou) 
 Institutional meanings - RE as an institutional social 
practice deemed to draw students together within a 
school community  
 Meanings within socio-religious community (which 
differ from the educational institutions ascription of 
meaning) 
 Meaning as intention – ‘this is what I mean by x.’ 
 
Despite recourse to so many refractions of ‘meaning’ it 
would appear that much religious education continues to fail 
to secure, for students (and in many case teachers), either 
epistemic or ethical meaning. There is in fact no very strong 
sense in our ethnographic records that religious education 
offers (1) an insight into the meaning theological claims have 
for their adherents (2) a coherent ground upon which the 
individual creates her own meanings rooted in something 
more substantial than oddly conceived personal preferences or 
(3) a transcendent ground for ethical attachment and moral 
behaviour. If meaning is constitutive of religious education 
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properly conceived, as we have suggested at the outset, it 
would appear to be, that the kinds of failures and confusions 
of meaning we have discussed above would appear to 
radically compromise religious education as an intentional 
social practice. 
What might we possibly mean by the term, ‘failures of 
meaning’? To come to some understanding of what such a 
failure of meaning might denote we need to consider 
‘meaning’ itself. This is no straightforward task since there is 
more than one answer to the question, ‘what does X mean?’ 
To delineate but a few senses of meaning we can see that it 
can refer to the import ascribed to particular linguistic 
utterances as in, ‘what does Mary mean when she says she 
can’t complete the task?’ Or it can refer to the ethico-religious 
import of particular actions such as the meaning of zakat for 
an observant Muslim. Yet again, it can indicate the 
significance that I attach to my particular life. Or, as was the 
case in one school in our study (a religiously denominated 
school), an icon attached to the wall (see Fig 1) might signify 
that this is a Catholic school. Simultaneously, it may signify 
(to the believer) that the incarnation is God’s redemptive act 
and so forth. Looked at another way, and juxtaposed as it was 
with a collection of examination focused targets and 
descriptions, it may merely serve to reinforce certain 
regulatory and examination norms. Or, it might suggest an 
interesting causal connection between veneration of the 
nativity and examination success. 
 
Fig 1. 
SEE Below 
 
The point here is that meaning is a notoriously and 
simultaneously allusive and elusive term and that, when used 
with respect to particular educational entailments, loses none 
of its characteristic slipperiness. Hence, when we ask what 
education means, some will argue that the question is itself 
‘meaningless’ (as indeed did some of our participants in the 
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Delphi seminar), by which they intend pointing out that there 
is no singular account of education that will satisfy all those 
who wish to employ the term. For example, the liberal 
educational tradition, represented by Richard Peters and his 
successors has tended to consider the meaning of education to 
be located in the claim that it points to certain liberal 
intellectual values; for Jacques Maritain (1943), its meaning is 
to be found in its being a preparation for the assumption of 
particular kinds of ‘spiritual ‘ freedom; for Robert Owen, 
amongst many others, its meaning is secured in the twin aims 
of emancipation and material success aiming, as it did for 
him, to meld the imperatives of character formation and 
securing the interests of capital ‘around the collaborative 
pursuit of material prosperity’ (Davis and O’Hagan 2010, 83). 
And these but scratch the surface. 
As we have seen in our ethnographic excurses  modern 
education often conflates ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’. In some of 
the examples cited above it can be a challenge to disaggregate 
the inscription of a meaning from the purposes of a particular 
activity. Hence meaning is intrinsic to the very activity of RE. 
In the case of religious studies (the study of religion) the 
purpose may be one of enhancing understanding of the 
phenomena. One is not required to have a meaningful 
encounter with the beliefs under scrutiny; in religious 
education, one is (at least theoretically). Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the text books and syllabuses for public 
examinations, where any claim to meaning has been displaced 
by the drive to fulfill one of the purposes we outlined above- 
that of passing an examination. Working at Key Stage 4 
teachers often found themselves caught between the 
competing imperatives of education and examination. Their 
desire to help students understand the complex and subtle 
nature of religious systems, beliefs and practices often 
conflicted with their fear that a lack of success in securing 
high pass rates would undermine an already fragile 
professional identity. Hence meaning surrenders to purpose 
with amazing facility. Indeed, we would argue, an important 
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consequence of the rise of performativity has been the 
displacement of meaning by purpose though arguably 
meaning itself, as we suggest at the outset, displaced ‘truth’. 
The difficulty for religious education lies precisely in this 
displacement. When we encumber it up with myriad 
entailments, in the belief that this will somehow make 
religious education stronger and therefore more resistant to 
the predations of performativity, there are two significant 
consequences. The first is that we turn religious education 
into its own antithesis and the second is the dilution of the 
character of meaning. And, as we have seen above, the 
classroom becomes a site of non-meaning or, at least for the 
elision of meaning. So it is that RE finds itself caught 
between two silences where it can make no substantive claims 
in the face of a performative and sceptical culture on the one 
hand and the mythical silence of the incommunicable and 
irreducible self on the other.  
 This inability to speak meaningfully about religion in 
the classroom leads to the cultivation of language without 
exchange value where the words fail to signify anything that 
resonates in the life of the student, where confusions, 
contradictions and conflations abound. Following Baudrillard, 
we recognise that it is precisely the illusion of neo-
individualism (1994, 106) with its atomistic approach to 
meaning (where students suggest that RE is the site par 
excellence for rendering public their unanchored opinions) 
which flattens the power of language and meaning, rendering 
void the space wherein imaginary networks and self-
representations may be exchanged for meaning. This 
flattening leads to expunging controversy by eliding out what 
is disturbing and discordant (Conroy 2004, 180). But it is also 
‘entirely profane...above all, sad, like everything that exhausts 
meaning. Lastly, it’s utterly boring’ (Baudrillard and Noailles 
2007, 10). This exasperated sigh, evoking the ‘boring’ echoes 
in many of the student responses in our study. 
The Baudrillardian model of language, interpreted in 
the light of Conroy’s (2009),work on liminality and 
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enstrangement, suggests there is a need for managed 
discomfort if religious education is to be emotionally 
transformative and restore its primary role as a site for 
meaning making. Religious language must escape the 
mundane, that ‘circuit of “liberated” words, gratuitously 
useable, circulating as exchange value’ (Baudrillard 1993, 
203), resisting simplifications or totally alienated 
significations.  
The constraints of the examination context coupled 
with an inattention attend to meaning is manifest in not only 
the spoken attitudes of teachers but in both the tasks and 
questions posed to students at this level and in the presented 
work of students. Two examples from different schools serve 
to illustrate this point. In the first (1), a set of GCSE 
examination questions,  the theological meanings of 
forgiveness are displaced by its being aligned to the political 
considerations of war. Lest one be in any doubt as to relative 
importance of forgiveness the mark scheme gives the game 
away! How, we might wish to ask, is a student to grasp the 
enormous theological complexity of a concept like 
forgiveness when (a) all that is required is a simplistic 
definition and (b) it is merely there to serve a subordinate 
function in the socio-moral discussion of war? So it is that the 
examinations process itself serves to evacuate the endeavour 
of religious meaning. Further, the triumph of purpose over 
meaning is witnessed in the rubric that students should use the 
‘correct GCSE technique’. In the second example the reductio 
ad absurdum is witnessed in the facile summation of some 
kind of distinction, though it’s not clear whether such a 
distinction is theological, social or philosophical, between 
Catholicism and Anglicanism. And it won’t do to dismiss this 
as just the work of a poor student given that theses serve only 
as examples of a much wider pattern of ‘meaning void’ 
questions and answers. 
Fig 2. 
SEE BELOW 
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Fig 3. 
 SEE BELOW 
The questionnaire, the structure of which emanated 
from emergent themes in the ethnography, offered further 
insights, most especially around students perceptions of how 
RE compared to other subjects in the curriculum.  An 
emerging consensus would suggest that RE was indeed 
different from ‘normal classes’. In some respects this 
difference can be construed as positive in so far as pupils felt 
that the lessons provided opportunities for greater engagement 
with social issues and they enjoyed a more open and 
approachable style of teaching.  However, they also rate RE 
as less important than other subjects.   The picture from the 
quantitative data tends to position RE as a subject concerned 
with the sharing of opinions rather than the reaching of any 
significant conclusions and to that extent coheres with what is 
found in the case studies.  The fact that most pupils do not 
ascribe any utilitarian worth to RE is a double edged sword in 
so far as they enjoy not feeling any pressure but neither do 
they see any need to ‘press for meaning’.  It also suggests that 
attempts to enhance the status of RE through making it an 
examination subject is, as we have seen in the case studies, 
unlikely to be successful. 
In the varied cases cited in this essay we see the 
inattention to meaning and the service of purpose without 
meaning. But if RE is to distinguish itself from other 
educational entailments then it is surely on the grounds that it 
does indeed bring something different – religious 
experience89− to bear in the educational space. Of course 
religious experience makes steep demands – it invites the 
enquirer to enter a space which is at once neither the property 
of the atomised individual nor of the community as a 
structurally closed static phenomenon, a space which belongs 
to the Ultimate. In this context, the individual, student and 
teacher, ought to be brought face to face with the 
incompleteness of their condition, their enstranged self. In 
this way religious language, to remain meaningful to the users 
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of that language, opens up the borderslands of our imaginings 
and is ‘neither restrictive nor penurious in this context: it is 
the fundamental rule of the symbolic’ (Baudrillard 1993, 
204).  
Even as we asked the question, ‘Does Religious 
Education work? we were faced immediately with a retreat 
from the complexity of meaning by recourse  to what Pinker 
(2008 p.374) suggests is ‘plausible deniablity’. During the 
Delphi seminar there were a number of attempts by 
colleagues to declare the question unanswerable because, in a 
move of sublime circularity, there were too many potential 
purposes and we would not know what ‘working’ meant in 
each case. Rather than succumb to plausible deniability is it 
not better to turn our attention away from all those purposes 
and ask, ‘Does it work in cultivating and communicating 
meaning?’ Repeatedly, questions of meaning were deferred 
and potentially interesting discussions were cut short so as to 
deliver on the purposes of religious education- to get through 
the syllabus. Too often we observed that by succumbing to 
the demands of the examination, the clock was run down with 
fatuous exercises and the question of meaning could not rear 
its disconsoling head. Often this was a result of succumbing 
to the weight of the examination system.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this essay we have illustrated the ways in which RE 
teachers in a variety of contexts have been unable to 
foreground meaning in ways that might reflect its constitutive 
position within the subject. It is no part of the argument here 
that such attention to meaning invariably has to affirm the 
claims of religious communities. Nor do our finding suggest 
that there is some singular account of meaning to be 
valorized. Indeed as Tomlinson and Engelke (2006, 2) argue,  
failures of meaning-making allow approaches to meaning as a 
contested and uncertain process, rather than an entity waiting 
to be uncovered. This contested conception of meaning allows 
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for the consideration of cultural artefacts, images and events 
that follow, not as the bars of a rigid cultural cage within 
which students and teachers are caught, but as the strands 
from which students and teachers weave a tapestry or 
tapestries of meaning. The hollowing out of religion and 
religious education in late industrial societies itself offers 
precisely such opportunities. As Bornstein (2006; 91) 
suggests, moments of meaninglessness for participants may 
themselves be both pedagogically and ethnographically 
meaningful. But this can only happen where the teacher has 
the capacity to recognise the significance of such moments of 
meaninglessness and respond to them.  
  On occasion, as with some schools in the study 
operating in areas of overwhelming secularism, indifference 
and hostility to religion, the tapestry can be almost blank, 
offering no points of reference from which to begin an 
exploration of the processes of meaning making within a 
given religious culture. In the end the enterprise of cultivating 
meaning is likely to fail so long as religious education both 
theoretically, and as a practice, continues to foreground 
purposes that must perforce offer too many contradictions as 
between the intellectual and the affective, the public and the 
private, the metaphorical and the literal, self-determination 
and civic cohesion and so forth. The displacement of meaning 
by purpose leaves religious education bereft of its single 
distinguishing feature − that meaning inheres in its very 
definition.  
 Central to the project design, and to our deliberations 
on the findings has been the interdisciplinary nature of the 
research team. In our reflections on the data and consequent 
analysis we had to face the possibility that our analysis might 
be considered no more than a lament for the loss of, or failure 
to realise, some putative golden age of RE.  In our defence 
two small observations can be made. First, the move from 
aspiration to enactment is one of the key areas for analysis in 
the original project design and secondly, the ‘lament’ if this is 
indeed what it is, can be seen in the disappointment expressed 
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by the pupils as much as in the interpretation by the 
researchers. 
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